The ability to record and account for the usage of computational resources in a standardised way across different systems from multiple administrative domains is a precursor to widespread Grid deployment and availability. We describe the implementation of a Resource Usage Service (RUS), which is based on two emerging Global Grid Forum (GGF) standards, and uses Web Services technology. We address the issue of security, which is essential since usage information is potentially sensitive and must be verifiably accurate.
Introduction
The most popular current approach in Grid Computing is to build grids using Service Oriented Architectures, typically based on existing and emerging Web Services standards. So a Grid can be seen as a collection of interacting services some of which virtualize the underlying resources, which can then be thought of as commodities. These include, but are not limited to, compute cycles, data storage, database access, information streams from sensors, and the use of experimental apparatus. In the future, it is likely that these resources will be traded, as well as consumed.
The need for a standardised way of recording usage, which will enable the above, has been recognised by the Grid community [1] . However, this is an area that has not received the attention it warrants, despite some initial efforts [2] [3] [4] . Resources on the Grid tend to be allocated and charged for through traditional (nonGrid) mechanisms, with the use of resources only being permitted through the prior negotiation of access, again through traditional mechanisms. For example, although it is possible to access resources on the Grid through Grid middleware, such as the Globus Toolkit [5] or UNICORE [6] you must first apply for an account on the underlying machines through non-Grid mechanisms. Similarly, usage can only be accounted for at the local system level rather than Grid-wide, as the mechanisms available tend to be designed for large multi-user computers or clusters operating within a single administrative domain, where the logging of usage is under the control of the resource management system that controls the resources, such as Load Sharing Facility (LSF) [7] or Portable Batch System (PBS) [8] . Indeed, on large specialist supercomputers proprietary mechanisms for accounting came as part of the management software. Grid computing is generally accepted to work across multiple-domains and strives to provide abstractions that hide the differences between management systems.
In order for Grid computing to realise its goal where users (or software operating on a users behalf) can dynamically discover and negotiate the use of previously unknown resources across multiple administrative domains, abstractions that permit the trading or exchange of resources between the different providers need to be established. The Market for Computational Services (MCS) project [11] , funded as part of the UK e-Science programme, aims to help bring this goal nearer, by using the model of a utilities market to provide some of the core components that are required for such an infrastructure. Only when Grid computing can provide standards-compliant services for accounting, measuring, and charging for resource usage, can the use of resources on the Grid become decoupled from traditional accounting and charging solutions.
We also believe that enabling resources to be re-sold is vital to the commercial development of the Grid. By introducing resellers into the Grid, you allow thirdparty companies-who might not own any Gridenabled resources-to contribute other areas of expertise, while allowing them to make a profit. One of 0-7803-9074-1/05/$20.00 ©2005 IEEE 6'54 the use cases produced by the MCS project discussed a Computational Chemistry reseller, who targeted computational chemists, providing-for a monthly fee-some supercomputer CPU hours with a number of "free" runs of the GaussianO4 software; subsequent usage would be charged at a set tariff [ 12] . In short, we have to enable new business models if commercial participation in the Grid is to take off. Only then can we realise the goal of grid computing as a utility, like electricity, water or gas.
The Market for Computational Services Project
The Markets for Computational Services (MCS) Project started in May 2003, and initial plans for the project were based upon the emerging Open Grid Services Infrastructure (OGSI) [13] . The aim was to produce a basic infrastructure during the first year of the project, covering the recording of resource usage and interfaces to charging mechanisms; and to build upon this in the second year, developing methods for aggregating and auctioning resources, while also refining the infrastructure. Descriptions of this planned work can be found in [9] [I0].
The abandonment of OGSI by those proposing it caused the goals of the MCS Project to be adjusted. Much of the second year of the project had to focus on refactoring the infrastructure to fit around Web Services. This task was complicated by the fact that the proposed architecture relied heavily upon those features of OGSI that deviated from standard Web Services.
As part of the second year work of the MCS Project, a prototype solution was developed for the user-guided discovery of computational resources suitable for the execution of a specified computational job. In addition to the Resource Usage Service, described in this paper, this end-to-end solution included a Resource Broker and a Quotation Service, as shown in the architecture diagram in Figure 1 . 
3.Architecture
The GGF Resource Usage Service working group has produced a specification, which defines a Resource Usage Service (RUS) [15] , whose purpose is to store accounting information. As this is only a draft, it is incomplete; some areas are underspecified, ambiguous and open to interpretation. The RUS specification itself depends upon the Usage Record format specification [14] , which is another draft GGF standard, albeit one which is nearer completion. This standard provides a common way of representing usage information for batch and interactive compute jobs in XML, which is independent of the system it was generated from. This enables the recording of usage in a homogeneous way from a set of heterogeneous resources. The Usage Record format has also been used in the accounting system developed as part of GridBank [4] , but this does not use the RUS specification.
The most recent version of the RUS specification is based on the Open Grid Services Infrastructure or OGSI, which is now obsolete. Consequently, we chose to implement a plain web service version of the Resource Usage Service and so the parts of the GGF specification relating to OGSI, e.g. the use of Service Data Elements, were re-interpreted within our implementation paradigm. We encountered no difficulties with this re-interpretation. The RUS is a persistent single instance service, whose job is to provide persistent storage of usage data. All the operations the RUS exposes to clients are atomic, there is no dependency between them; consequently interactions with the RUS are stateless.
Account
Resource Usage Figure 1 . End-to-End Economic Architecture Implemented in the MCS Project
The three fundamental requirements, which drive the architecture of the Resource Usage Service, are as follows. Firstly, it must provide persistent storage and retrieval of XML Usage Records, conforming to the format defined by the GGF Usage Record Working Group [14] . Secondly, it must implement the WSDL port-types defined in the GGF Resource Usage Service Specification [15] . The final requirement is that read and write access to the data stored must be restricted to ensure privacy and prevent fraud.
As the RUS is a system on which fmancial transactions ultimately depend, security is of the utmost importance. Ensuring the privacy of data requires read access to be restricted on a per record basis. For The XML:DB API supports queries using XPath [18] and record modification using XUpdate [19] . We used WS-Security [22] using X.509 digital certificates both for guaranteeing message integrity and for authentication of the entity invoking a RUS operation. This has been implemented into the JAX-RPC handler mechanism. When the web-services container invokes the application code for an operation, the application code can retrieve the verified X.509 distinguished name of the client entity and also be sure that the message has not be tampered with. The next step is to authorise the client entity. For all operations, the client entity is categorised as either an administrator or a resource manager. If the client entity has no entry for its distinguished name in the access control list then a RUSUserNotAuthorisedFault message is returned. If the client is determined to be an administrator then no further authorisation is required. For resource managers, per record authorisation is required and this is implemented in one of two ways depending on whether the operation is based on a query or not. For query based operations, such as RUS: :deleteRecords, the XPath query is extended with extra predicates derived from the permitted resources list. This ensures that the query only returns records for which the resource manager is authorised. For non-query operations, such as RUS: :insertUsageRecords, the resource manager must be authorised for each record in turn. This is implemented in the RUS by first determining the set of records affected by the operation, and then determining whether the resource manager is authorised by checking the values of the elements in the usage record against the permitted resources defined in the entry in the access control list. If a resource manager is not permitted to perform an operation on a specific record, for example using the RUS::deleteSpecific operation, then rus:permissionDenied is returned in the rus: operationalResult element.
Only those defimed as administrators and resource managers are allowed to access the RUS. However, allowing individual users to check their personal resource usage is desirable feature. We have devised an architecture that permits this and does not require the configuration of individual users in the access control list of the RUS. This system is shown in Figure 3 .
Users are able to access the query system through a web browser, using the SSL protocol for client authentication. A query form is presented to the user, which allows them to select a pre-defmed query or enter their own XPath query. The form is sent to the Java Servlet and it appends an extra predicate to the XPath query, which ensures that only the records corresponding to the authenticated user's usage can be returned. The Servlet sends the query to the RUS web service, and returns the results to the users as a HTML page. The RUS Query Servlet must have permission to access the RUS as either an administrator or a resource manager. The alternative to this mutli-tiered approach would be to append the extra predicate at the RUS itself when a query operation is invoked and the requesting entity is not know to the RUS through the access control list. This approach has several disadvantagesthe user must have a bespoke application capable of querying the RUS; intermediate processing of the query and responses is not possible; a denial of service attack exists as anyone can make the RUS execute a query. We have successfully used this approach to provide a web-based administration interface, which exposes all operations of the RUS. 
Performance Characterisation
The RUS is expected to be deployed on high job throughput clusters and grids. This requires that the RUS must have high storage capacity, low processing overhead for read and write operations, and is able to handle with a large number of transactions per second. The performance characterisation and subsequent tuning is necessary before deployment. 
7.Conclusions and Future Work
In our implementation WS-Security has been used to provide authentication and message integrity. An alternative approach would be to use Transport Layer Security [23] . The advantage of TLS is that it is widely available, and it is mature. In addition, available TLS implementations would appear to be much faster than using Java-based WS-Security. TLS would also provide a means to encrypt the messages sent between a client and the RUS, which is not yet available in our WS-Security implementation.
We expect large volumes of usage data to be produced by future Grid services, and this data must be stored for an indefinite period. This will require the RUS to provide an archiving capability, where records over a certain age can be moved out of the RUS into archive storage. We currently use Xindice's backup functionality to keep copies of the data, but there is no mechanism for pruning old records from the database.
We are working towards deploying the RUS on the CSAR HPC facility at the University of Manchester [24] . The 
